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Summary
New forms of business in the sharing economy, and new technologies like autonomous vehicles, have the
potential to “disrupt” existing regulatory structures. This seminar examined the challenges facing regulators
and legislators, who must respond so as to both (a) promote innovation and (b) protect the public interest.
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Seminar by Professor Sarah Light
Disruptive innovation has a technical meaning to business scholars. It signifies when a new firm 
picks off customers from an existing business, by coming up with a new product or service that is 
actually slightly inferior to the product or service offered by the existing firm. For instance, Airbnb 
offers up rooms in people’s homes in place of a traditional hotel room. Some (but not all!) disruptive 
innovations lead to what might be called policy disruption, in that they in some way challenge the 
current regulatory regime. 1 
FOUR TYPES OF POLICY DISRUPTION
• End-run whereby the innovator is able to argue—notwithstanding 
similarities to the incumbent industry—that it is not subject to regula-
tions that govern the incumbent. Think of Uber’s argument that it is not a 
taxi service and thus should not be regulated as such.
• Exemption in which the innovating firm fits into an express 
exemption in the law, but when the innovator scales up, it produces the 
same problems that the existing law was designed to address, raising the 
question of whether the exemption needs to be closed. For example: Let’s 
suppose a woman wants to rent a room in her private home. For privacy 
and personal comfort, she may legally choose to only rent the room to 
another woman, despite laws that protect against sex discrimination. But 
what if large numbers of female Airbnb hosts elected to do that same 
thing, and rent only to other women? That could create a social problem 
that anti-discrimination laws were designed to prevent. 
• Gap where there is no existing regulatory regime that clearly applies to 
the innovator. Consider automobiles when they were first invented; there 
were no regulations governing their use.
• Solution where an innovation actually solves a regulatory problem, 
but which may be blocked by existing regulations from entering the mar-
ket. A current example is distributed solar generation, which would solve 
aspects of climate change. But over-inclusive legal rules, which might re-
quire every individual desiring solar panels to apply for permission to the 
state utility commission to connect to the grid, would impede adoption of 
the technology.
HOW SHOULD REGULATORS RESPOND? 
Just as there are four types of policy disruptions, there are four 
kinds of policy responses (although there is not a one-to-one corre-
spondence between disruptions and responses):
• Block - Interpret legal rules so as to prevent the innovator from enter-
ing the market.
• Free Pass - Regulators allow the innovator into the market and do 
not apply the existing rules that govern incumbents. This is the most in-
novation-friendly option, but it can endanger if not doom the old business 
model, as has happened to taxis wherever Uber and Lyft operate.
• Old Reg - Apply existing rules to the innovating business.
• New Reg - Old rules do not fit, so regulators realize they need to 
write new rules to deal with issues raised by innovators.
 1  This policy brief is based on research published as Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 1561 (2017), and Sarah E Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 Washington University Law Review 325 (2017). The Three-Step Process chart appears at page 1610 of Regulating Business 
Innovation.
NOTES
WHO SHOULD REGULATE
Disruptive innovation (in the business sense) does not always 
lead to policy disruption. When it does, policymakers benefit from 
having a roadmap to make regulatory oversight decisions. If addi-
tional regulation is needed, “who should regulate” (state or federal 
government) may be part of the decision making process. Policy-
makers need to consider whether local or national concerns will 
predominate.  There are four possible responses to the “who should 
regulate” dilemma:
• No regulation –private standards, self-regulation; 
• Federal regulations preempt state laws; 
• States regulate in absence of Federal law; 
• Concurrent (dynamic) jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION
Innovation in business is not only important for a strong economy, 
it is a natural response to changing technologies and consumer de-
mands. Yet, it is the role of government to protect consumers from 
fraud, unsafe products, and general malfeasance.  The three-step 
process outlined in this summary can serve as a general road-map 
for deciding how much regulatory oversight is needed to protect 
public interest while not tampering innovation. 
With all of the options, aside from the Block, a secondary policy 
question also arises: What, if anything, should be done for the 
incumbent firms? Should incumbents be compensated in some way 
for the market changes produced by the entry of the innovating 
business? The question of a buyout should be separate because we 
don’t want regulatory system to be picking winners and losers, or to 
inhibit access to innovations that people find useful.
Aspects of Uber pertain to all of the possible policy responses. 
When Uber and Lyft first launched, Philadelphia, for instance,       
initially instituted the Block, declared them illegal and prohibit-
ed their drivers from operating within the city. Other locations 
instituted the Free Pass, allowing Uber and Lyft to operate without 
requiring that they comply with regulations applied to taxis, while 
others took an Old Reg approach, bringing Uber and Lyft into the 
local market while applying at least some of the current regulatory 
regime—for example, background checks for drivers. And then 
there were places such as California that implemented a New Reg 
response, creating an entirely new type of entity called a transpor-
tation network company, with its own rules and requirements. (At 
the same time, some localities also may have adjusted rules for 
taxis.) And then came the question of buyouts—for instance, taxi 
medallion owners in New York City who have brought suit against 
the city over the decline in the value of their medallions when the 
city failed to block the entry of Uber and Lyft.
From a business perspective, what should regulators be concerned 
about, with respect to balancing innovation with the public interest? 
Focus on substance over form. Unless there is some public interest 
that dictates otherwise, treat incumbents and innovators equally 
under the law if they provide the same product or service, even if 
they deliver it in different forms. 
THREE-STEP PROCESS
 
 
 
Case Example: Autonomous Vehicles
AVs are an excellent subject for a study of policy disrup-
tion, to illustrate how we should regulate, as well as who 
should regulate. Current law puts the regulation of vehicles 
in to the hands of the federal government, as defined by 
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which makes the 
US Department of Transportation responsible for issuing 
vehicle safety standards. Regulation of drivers, however, 
is left to the states, which are responsible for licensing and 
setting insurance rules, traffic safety laws, and tort laws. The 
development of AVs, however, poses a policy disruption: Is 
the AV a “motor vehicle” or is it a “driver” . . . or is it both . . 
. or neither? And thus should regulation be left to the states, 
or to the federal government . . . or some combination . . . or 
none of the above?
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STEP ONE
Does the existing legal regime treat the innovator differently from the 
incumbent based on its form of business organization?
Does it Block entry of the innovator and protect incumbents? Does it give 
the innovator a Free Pass to the detriment of the incumbent?
Default principle should be organizationally neutral law. 
STEP TWO
Should the neutral default be outweighed by public policy factors?
If yes: Block or Free Pass (non-neutral), depending upon whether the policy 
concerns outweigh neutrality principle.
If no: OldReg or NewReg (both can approach neutrality), depending upon 
whether existing rules can be applied to both the incumbent and the 
innovator, and whether the innovator raises any new policy concerns.
STEP THREE
Does the policy strategy upset an incumbent’s reliance interests, 
dilute revenue streams, or strains assets for the incumbent in ways 
that we should care about? If so, consider adding a Buy Out to the 
chosen strategy: 
Free Pass: strongest case for a Buy Out 
NewReg: weaker case for a Buy Out 
OldReg: intermediate case for a Buy Out
